Mountbatten Plan Cabinet Mission The changed global scenario in the post– World War II context led to the setting up of the Cabinet Mission. Headed by Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps with A.V.Alexander and Pethick Lawrence as members the mission landed in India in March and began work on its brief: to set up a national government before the final transfer of power. The mission proposed to constitute a ‘representative’ body by way of elections across the provinces and the princely states and entrust this body with the task of making a constitution for free India. The idea of partition did not figure at this stage.
Instead, the mission’s proposal was for a loose-knit confederation in which the Muslim League could dominate the administration in the North-East and North-West provinces while the Congress would administer rest of the provinces. Jinnah sounded out his acceptance of the idea on June , . The Congress, meanwhile, perceived the Cabinet Mission’s plan as a clear sanction for the setting up of a Constituent Assembly. Nehru conveyed through his speech at the AICC, on July , , that the Indian National Congress accepted the proposal.
Subsequently, Jinnah on July , , reacted to this and announced that the League stood opposed to the plan. Last Phase of Indian National Movement in the interim government. The Muslim League accepted the proposal but Jinnah refused to join the cabinet. The interim cabinet was reconstituted on October , .
Those who joined on behalf of the League were Liaquat Ali Khan, I.I. Chundrigar, A. R. Nishtar, Ghazanfar Ali Khan and Jogendra Nath Mandal.
But there was no let-up in the animosity between the Congress and the League and this was reflected in the functioning (rather non-functioning) of the interim council of ministers. The League, meanwhile, was determined against cooperating in the making of the constituent assembly. At another level, the nation was in the grip of communal violence of unprecedented magnitude. Naokhali in East Bengal was ravaged by communal violence.